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Your Appels to Intuition Have No Power Here! 
Moti Mizrahi  
Abstract: In this paper, I argue that appeals to intuition in Analytic Philosophy are not 
compelling arguments because intuitions are not the sort of thing that has the power to rationally 
persuade other professional analytic philosophers. This conclusion follows from reasonable 
premises about the goal of Analytic Philosophy, which is rational persuasion by means of 
arguments, and the requirement that evidence for and/or against philosophical theses used by 
professional analytic philosophers be public (or transparent) in order to have the power to 
rationally persuade other professional analytic philosophers. Since intuitions are not public (or 
transparent) evidence, it follows that appeals to intuition are not compelling arguments for and/or 
against philosophical theses because they lack the power to rationally persuade other 
professional analytic philosophers. 




There is an ongoing methodological debate in contemporary Analytic Philosophy1 concerning 
the use of intuitions as evidence (see, e.g., Hannon 2018). Participants in this debate concern 
themselves with “questions like ‘Are intuitions that p used as evidence that p?’ and ‘Are 
intuitions that p evidence that p?’” (Andow 2016, p. 244). Some analytic philosophers, like 
Chalmers (2014, p. 535), “find it fairly obvious that many philosophers, including [himself], 
appeal to intuitions,” whereas others, like Deutsch (2015), deny that intuitions play an evidential 
role in Analytic Philosophy. Rather than ask, “[D]o philosophers use intuitions as evidence, or 
take intuitions to be evidence?” (Climenhaga 2018, p. 72), I would like to ask a somewhat 
different question in this paper; that is, are intuitions good (or compelling) evidence for and/or 
against philosophical theses? 
In this paper, I develop a new argument to the effect that intuitions are not good (or 
compelling) evidence for and/or against philosophical theses. The focus of this paper is the use 
of intuitions as evidence in Analytic Philosophy, or more precisely, the use of appeals to 
intuition as a philosophical methodology or style of argument, not the ontology or psychology of 
intuitions (De Cruz 2015). An appeal to intuition is an argument that proceeds from the premise 
that S intuits that p to the conclusion that p.2 In Analytic Philosophy, such arguments are usually 
made in the context of hypothetical cases, which is why this style of argument is also known as 
the “method of cases” (see, e.g., Baz 2016a, 2016b), “which consists in eliciting an intuitive 
 
1 According to Schwitzgebel et al. (2018, p. 22), “Mainstream Anglophone philosophy is vague-boundaried and 
nebulous. However, it can be characterized well enough to permit sociological examination. Participants in this 
group are philosophers who write primarily in English (regardless of their native language); publish in English-
language academic journals that are widely regarded as prestigious by other English-language philosophers, such as 
Philosophical Review and Ethics; belong to PhD-granting departments that are ranked in the Philosophical Gourmet 
Report, or have close scholarly ties to people in those departments; and are highly cited in the Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy and in prestigious English-language journals.” 
2 According to Levy (2013, p. 382), “to intuit that p is for one to have a relatively forceful impression that p seems 
to be the case.” See Climenhaga (2018, pp. 69-70). 
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judgment as a response to a described hypothetical case” (Cohnitz and Haukioja 2015, pp. 617-
618). According to Mizrahi (2014, p. 186), the “method of cases” consists of the following steps: 
Step 1: Intuition Pump. In this step, S considers a hypothetical case C that is supposed to 
elicit an intuition (i.e., an intellectual seeming or intuitive appearance) I. 
Step 2: Appeal to Intuition. In this step, S uses the content of I (whose justifier is that it 
intellectually seems/intuitively appears to S that I is the case in C) as a premise in 
an argument for or against a philosophical theory T.3 
Likewise, Suhler (2019, p. 829) summarizes the “method of cases” as follows: 
1. Propose a theory setting out criteria for some phenomenon of philosophical interest (e.g., 
knowledge is justified true belief). 
2. Test whether the theory’s criteria yield verdicts that match our intuitions in particular 
cases, including imaginary cases (thought experiments) that we devise for the express 
purpose of testing the theory. 
3. If the theory’s verdict matches up with our intuitions about a particular case, this is 
evidence for the theory’s adequacy. If the theory’s verdict fails to match up with our 
intuitions about a particular case, this is evidence against the theory’s adequacy; if such a 
counterexample is encountered, one (generally) should revise the theory and repeat the 
process.4 
In this paper, I focus on appeals to intuition in particular, i.e., Step 2 in Mizrahi’s (2014, p. 189) 
description and Step 2 in Suhler’s (2019, p. 829) description of the “method of cases.” For any 
appeal to what seems to one to be the case as evidence that what seems to one to be the case is in 
fact the case, whether in response to a hypothetical case or not, is an appeal to intuition. That is 
(Ashton and Mizrahi 2018, p. 602): 
It seems to S that p. 
∴ p.5 
Accordingly, appeals to intuition are arguments in which the evidence for p is supposed to 
consist in S finding p intuitive. Bach (1984, p. 38) labels this kind of reasoning “default 
reasoning,” which is based on what he calls the “take-for-granted rule”: “If it seems to me that p, 
then infer that p, provided no reason to the contrary occurs to me” (Bach 1984, p. 43).6 For 
example, when Jackson (1982, p. 130) writes, “It seems just obvious that [Mary] will learn 
something about the world and our visual experience of it” (emphasis added), he appeals to his 
own intuition that Mary will learn something new upon exiting the black and white room. He 
then uses the content of his intuition, namely, <Mary learns something about the world when she 
leaves the black and white room> as evidence that Mary does in fact learn something new upon 
 
3 See also Machery (2017, Ch. 1). 
4 See also Baz (2016a, p. 107). 
5 According to Williamson (2007, p. 214), “When contemporary analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they 
appeal to intuitions.” However, an appeal to intuition is itself a type of argument. When one appeals to intuition, 
one’s conclusion that p is supposed to be supported by the fact that one has a “relatively forceful impression that p 
seems to be the case” (Levy 2013, p. 382). See also Mizrahi (2015, pp. 142-143). 
6 Cf. Huemer’s (2007, p. 30) Phenomenal Conservatism: “If it seems to S that p, then, in the absence of defeaters, S 
thereby has at least some degree of justification for believing that p.” See Moretti (2015). 
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her release, which he then uses as a premise in his argument against physicalism (see Mizrahi 
2014, pp. 184-185). The question for present purposes, then, is whether the “take-for-granted” 
rule is a good philosophical methodology. Are appeals to intuition compelling arguments, i.e., 
the sort of arguments that proceed from premises that have the “power to compel agreement” 
(Chalmers 2015, p. 25) among professional analytic philosophers? To put it another way, are 
appeals to intuition the sort of arguments that have the power to rationally persuade other 
professional analytic philosophers? In this paper, when I talk about appeals to intuition in 
Analytic Philosophy, I mean arguments with “S intuits that p” (or “It seems to S that p”) as a 
premise and “p” as the conclusion.7 
In what follows, I argue that appeals to intuition in Analytic Philosophy are not 
compelling arguments because intuitions are not the sort of thing that has the power to rationally 
persuade other professional analytic philosophers. My overall argument consists of three parts. 
The conclusion of the first part is that the goal of Analytic Philosophy is “to compel agreement” 
(Chalmers 2015, p. 25) or rational persuasion. I sketch this part of my overall argument in 
Section 2. The conclusion of the second part is that evidence for and/or against philosophical 
theses must be public (or transparent) in order “to compel agreement” (Chalmers 2015, p. 25) or 
rationally persuade other professional analytic philosophers. I sketch this part of my overall 
argument in Section 3. The conclusion of the third part is that intuitions are not the sort of thing 
that has the power “to compel agreement” (Chalmers 2015, p. 25) or rationally persuade other 
professional analytic philosophers. I sketch this part of my overall argument in Section 4. In 
Section 5, I anticipate and respond to several objections. If my overall argument is sound, then 
appeals to intuition are not compelling arguments for and/or against philosophical theses, since 
intuitions lack the power “to compel agreement” (Chalmers 2015, p. 25) or rationally persuade 
other professional analytic philosophers.8 
 
2. The Heart of Analytic Philosophy is Argument 
Introductory texts tell students that the heart of philosophy is argumentation. For example, 
according to Lacewing (2014, p. 7), “At the heart of philosophy is philosophical argument.”9 In 
practice, too, philosophers generally agree that doing philosophy professionally (as opposed to 
amateurishly) means advancing arguments for and/or against philosophical theses. As Verene 
(1989, p. 141) writes: 
 
7 See Mizrahi (2014, p. 186), Baz (2016a, p. 107), and Suhler (2019, p. 829). As mentioned above, some (e.g., 
Deutsch 2015) deny that professional analytic philosophers make such arguments in philosophical practice. I will 
say more about that in Section 5. Even if professional analytic philosophers do not appeal to intuitions in 
philosophical practice, it might still be useful to have an argument that shows that appeals to intuition are bad 
arguments. Cf. Molyneux (2014). 
8 Molyneux (2014, p. 441) distinguishes between “descriptive evidentialism,” which is the view that intuitions are 
treated as evidence in Analytic Philosophy, and “normative evidentialism,” which is the view that intuitions should 
be treated as evidence in Analytic Philosophy. As mentioned in footnote 7, even if professional analytic 
philosophers do not appeal to intuitions in philosophical practice, it might still be useful to have an argument that 
shows that appeals to intuition are bad arguments. In that respect, it is also worth mentioning that professional 
analytic philosophers could be using intuitions is some non-evidential ways (see, e.g., Ramsey 2019). 
9 See also Martin (2017), Harrell (2016), and Taylor (1995). 
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That philosophy essentially depends on argument is taken as such common knowledge 
that to dispute it seems simply to abandon philosophy for some other form of thinking 
(emphasis added). 
Similarly, Bruce and Barbone (2011, p. 1) express the point about the essence of philosophy 
being argumentation as follows: “’Show me the argument’ is the battle cry for philosophers.” 
Moreover, the conviction that the heart of philosophy is argument also plays a role in 
philosophical argumentation itself. For instance, Cohen (2004, p. 117) argues that, “If argument 
is the heart of philosophy, then metaphor is its life-giving blood.” 
When it comes to Analytic Philosophy in particular, the emphasis on argumentation is 
even more pronounced, although “emphasis on argumentation has always been central—and 
self-consciously so—in philosophy” (Beaney 2013, p. 24). According to the manifesto of the 
European Society for Analytic Philosophy (ESAP), “Analytic philosophy is characterized above 
all by the goal of clarity, the insistence on explicit argumentation in philosophy, and the demand 
that any view expressed be exposed to the rigours of critical evaluation and discussion by peers” 
(quoted in Dainton and Robinson 2014, p. xii). As Beaney (2013, p. 24) puts it, “analytic 
philosophy is widely regarded as placing emphasis on argumentation, clarity, and rigour.” 
Likewise, Soames (2003, p. xiii) writes that analytic philosophers are committed “to the ideals of 
clarity, rigor, and argumentation.” 
Now, if philosophy in general, and Analytic Philosophy in particular, are all about 
argumentation, i.e., if doing analytic philosophy professionally essentially means putting forth 
arguments for and/or against philosophical theses, then the next question is this: what do 
professional analytic philosophers aim to accomplish when they advance arguments for and/or 
against philosophical theses? According to argumentation theorists, the aim of argumentation is 
rational persuasion. When arguers advance arguments, they aim to rationally persuade their 
audience. As Johnson (2000, p. 168) writes: 
An argument is a type of discourse or text---the distillate of the practice of 
argumentation—in which the arguer seeks to persuade the Other(s) of the truth of a 
thesis by producing the reasons that support it (emphasis added).10 
In other words, when we argue we aim to provide (good) reasons or evidence in an attempt to 
convince others to believe what we believe to be true. For reasons or evidence is “that which 
justifies belief” (Achinstein 2001, p. 25) and “[a]t the end of reasons comes persuasion” 
(Wittgenstein 1969, §612).11 Persuasion here means rational persuasion, or “persuasion by 
[good] reasons” (Bermejo-Luque 2011, p. 29), i.e., to persuade by offering (good) reasons or 
(compelling) evidence in support of what one believes to be the case. As Govier (2010, p. 2) 
writes, “When we use arguments in the sense of offering reasons for our beliefs, we are 
responding to controversies by attempting rational persuasion.” Without rational persuasion at 
the end of reasons, two arguers would be like the two people in Monty Python’s argument clinic, 
exchanging “Yes, it is” and “No, it isn’t” back and forth with no end in sight. 
 
10 See also Govier and Hoaglund (1999, p. 99). 
11 See also Mitova (2017, Ch. 6) and Trafford (2017, Ch. 4). 
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Putting these two claims together, namely, that the essence of Analytic Philosophy is 
argumentation and that the goal of argumentation is rational persuasion, we can sketch the 
following argument concerning the goal of Analytic Philosophy. 
(1) The essence of Analytic Philosophy is argumentation. 
(2) The goal of argumentation is rational persuasion. 
Therefore, 
(3) The goal of Analytic Philosophy is rational persuasion. 
This argument is the first part of my overall argument. Let me try to alleviate a few concerns at 
the outset. One might think that the goal of Analytic Philosophy is knowledge, truth, or 
understanding, so it is important to note that to say that the goal of Analytic Philosophy is 
rational persuasion is not incompatible with saying that the goal of Analytic Philosophy is 
knowledge, truth, or understanding. This is because the means of getting to knowledge, truth, or 
understanding are arguments. How else would professional analytic philosophers know that they 
have discovered truth, attained knowledge, or gained understanding in Analytic Philosophy if not 
by means of philosophical argumentation? Indeed, in any academic discipline or professional 
field of inquiry, including Analytic Philosophy, practitioners take a thesis, hypothesis, or theory 
to be true, count as knowledge, or provide understanding just in case it can be supported by good 
reasons or compelling evidence. As Bermejo-Luque (2011, p. 118) writes, “Argumentation is 
also a means to produce ‘rational persuasion’, that is, to produce persuasion prompted by 
reasons.” 
One might also worry that the rational persuasion of others is not essential to 
argumentation, so it is important to note that, as in any academic discipline or professional field 
of inquiry, professional analytic philosophers try to rationally persuade peers that their theses are 
worthy of presentation in conferences, publication in journals and/or books, and citation by other 
practitioners in the field. They do so by subjecting their theses, presented in the form of 
argumentative papers, to peer review whenever they submit their papers to conferences and/or 
journals. In other words, in Analytic Philosophy, as in any academic discipline or professional 
field of inquiry, practitioners aim to rationally persuade their peers to believe their theses by 
advancing arguments in support of those theses. In Analytic Philosophy, as in any academic 
discipline or professional field of inquiry, it is not enough that one is rationally persuaded by 
one’s own arguments; rather, one has to persuade one’s peers by offering (good) reasons or 
(compelling) evidence in support of what one believes to be the case. Of course, professional 
analytic philosophers do not have to rationally persuade every person on the street that their 
philosophical theses are worthy of belief (although they could try to do that, without risking 
death by hemlock, one would hope).12 Rather, they have to rationally persuade some of their 
academic peers, such as reviewers and editors, at academic conferences where they present their 
 
12 Some think that professional analytic philosophers should engage in so-called “public philosophy.” The American 
Philosophical Association has a Public Philosophy Committee whose charge is “to find and create opportunities to 
demonstrate the personal value and social usefulness of philosophy” (https://www.apaonline.org/group/public). If 
professional analytic philosophers are required to do public philosophy in addition to academic philosophy, then the 
demand to appeal to evidence that has the power to rationally persuade others would only be stronger, not weaker. 
For, in that case, “others” would include not only professional analytic philosophers but also laypeople. 
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scholarly work or when they submit papers to be considered for publication in academic 
journals. 
In fact, that is precisely what I am doing right now. Having presented this paper at 
academic conferences, I am trying to rationally persuade you, my academic peer and colleague, 
that my thesis, namely, that appeals to intuition in Analytic Philosophy are not compelling 
arguments because intuitions are not the sort of thing that has the power to rationally persuade 
other professional analytic philosophers, is worthy of consideration. It is not enough that I am 
rationally persuaded by my own (good) reasons or (compelling) evidence for this thesis. Rather, I 
have to rationally persuade the anonymous reviewers for the academic journal to which I have 
submitted my paper. And I attempt to do so by giving (what I take to be) good reasons or 
compelling evidence for it, given that rational persuasion is “using an argument where all the 
premises are accepted by the respondent [e.g., a reader, a reviewer, a referee, an editor, etc.] and 
where the argument is rationally binding by some standard of structural correctness of the 
argument from the premises to the conclusion” (Walton 2005, p. 126). 
With (3), i.e., that the goal of Analytic Philosophy is rational persuasion, in hand, we can 
now proceed to the second part of my overall argument. Using (3), I argue that “that which 
justifies belief” (Achinstein 2001, p. 25), i.e., (good) reasons or (compelling) evidence, must be 
public (or transparent) in order to have the power to rationally persuade other professional 
analytic philosophers. 
 
3. Philosophical evidence must be public to be rationally persuasive 
In the previous section, I argued that the goal of Analytic Philosophy is rational persuasion. 
Professional analytic philosophers try to persuade their peers by providing (good) reasons or 
(compelling) evidence in support of their philosophical theses. For such reasons or evidence to 
have the power to rationally persuade other professional analytic philosophers, however, they 
must be able to have an effect not only on oneself but also on one’s academic peers. As Peirce 
(1877, p. 10) writes: 
Our external permanency would not be external, in our sense, if it was restricted in its 
influence to one individual. It must be something which affects, or might affect, every 
man. 
In other words, (good) reasons or (compelling) evidence must have the power “to compel 
agreement” (Chalmers 2015, p. 25) or to rationally persuade others; otherwise, they would be 
useless as far as attaining the goal of argumentation is concerned. To attain the goal of 
philosophical argumentation, which is rational persuasion, philosophical reasons or evidence 
must be something that affects, or might affect, other professional analytic philosophers; in other 
words, philosophical reasons or evidence must be public. If philosophical evidence is not public, 
it would not have the power to rationally persuade professional analytic philosophers other than 
oneself, and thus the goal of philosophical argumentation could never be attained. Given that the 
goal of philosophical argumentation is rational persuasion, philosophical evidence must be 




From the claim that the goal of Analytic Philosophy is rational persuasion, then, it 
follows that philosophical evidence must be public; otherwise, it would not have the power “to 
compel agreement” (Chalmers 2015, p. 25) or to rationally persuade other professional analytic 
philosophers and the goal of Analytic Philosophy could never be achieved. That is: 
(3) The goal of Analytic Philosophy is rational persuasion. 
(4) If the goal of Analytic Philosophy is rational persuasion, then philosophical evidence 
must be public in order to have the power to rationally persuade other professional 
analytic philosophers. 
Therefore, 
(5) Philosophical evidence must be public in order to have the power to rationally 
persuade other professional analytic philosophers. 
This argument is the second part of my overall argument. Again, let me try to alleviate a few 
concerns at the outset. I have characterized public reasons or evidence in terms of the power to 
have an effect on others, specifically, the power to “to compel agreement” (Chalmers 2015, p. 
25) or to rationally persuade other professional analytic philosophers. The term ‘public’ is used 
in many ways, so it can be misinterpreted. To avoid misinterpretations, I would like to point out 
that nothing hangs on the term ‘public’ per se. The same point can be made using the term 
‘transparent’. For instance, on Dutilh Novaes’ (2015, p. 601) dialogical account of the 
normativity of logic, “the didactic, cooperative component is […] represented by the 
methodological desideratum that a deductive argument be perspicuous and explanatory, i.e., that 
each individual step be persuasive and transparent” (emphasis added). Similarly, for 
philosophical reasons or evidence to be rationally persuasive, they must be transparent (or 
public). And for appeals to intuition in Analytic Philosophy to be compelling arguments, i.e., the 
sort of arguments that can rationally persuade other professional analytic philosophers, each step 
in those arguments must be persuasive and transparent.13 
With (5), i.e., that philosophical evidence must be public (or transparent) in order to have 
the power “to compel agreement” (Chalmers 2015, p. 25) or to rationally persuade other 
professional analytic philosophers, in hand, we can now proceed to the third part of my overall 
argument. Using (5), I argue that intuitions are not the sort of thing that has the power to 
rationally persuade other professional analytic philosophers. More explicitly, intuitions are not 
public (or transparent) evidence, and thus they lack the power to rationally persuade other 
professional analytic philosophers. 
 
4. Intuitions lack the power to rationally persuade other professional analytic philosophers 
In the previous section, I argued that philosophical reasons or evidence must be public (or 
transparent) in order to have the power to rationally persuade other professional analytic 
philosophers, given that the goal of Analytic Philosophy is rational persuasion by means of 
arguments. Evidence that is not public (or transparent) can have no effect on others, and hence is 
not the sort of thing that can rationally persuade others. In other words, arguments that appeal to 
 
13 On the publicity, transparency, or intersubjectivity of evidence, see Kelly (2016). 
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evidence that is not public (or transparent) cannot be compelling arguments because such 
evidence lacks the power to rationally persuade one’s academic peers. When said about evidence 
or arguments, “compelling” means “inspiring conviction,” or possessing the power “to compel 
agreement” (Chalmers 2015, p. 25). Therefore, evidence cannot be compelling if it lacks the 
power to inspire conviction in others. Accordingly, arguments that appeal to evidence that is not 
public (or transparent) are arguments that appeal to evidence that lacks the power to rationally 
persuade others, and thus are not compelling arguments. 
Now, there is a debate in Analytic Philosophy as to the nature of intuitions.14 
Nevertheless, most philosophers agree that intuitions are psychological or mental states. As 
Cappelen (2012, p. 8) writes, “Many philosophers […] take ‘intuition’ to denote a psychological 
(mental) state or event.” Likewise, according to Climenhaga (2018, p. 70), “intuitions [are] 
mental states that we find ourselves in when considering particular propositions. [O]ne has an 
intuition that P [when] it seems to one that P.”15 If “one has an intuition that P [when] it seems to 
one that P” (Climenhaga 2018, p. 70), then intuitions are personal and private mental states. In 
other words, intuition is not a public (or transparent) source of evidence. As such, intuitions are 
not “something which affects, or might affect, every man” (Peirce 1877, p. 10). Rather, an 
intuition is something that affects, or might affect, only the person who has it. That is, if I have 
the intuition that p, then that intuition can only have an effect on me insofar as I have it. You 
might have an intuition that p as well. But your intuition is yours and my intuition is mine; they 
are distinct mental states, even if the content of our intuitions, namely, p, might be the same. 
When I appeal to intuition, I use my intuition that p as evidence for p, whereas when you appeal 
to intuition, you use your intuition that p as evidence for p. Although we are both arguing for p 
by appeal to intuition, our evidence is not the same: my evidence is my intuition that p, whereas 
your evidence is your intuition that p. Clearly, your intuition that p and my intuition that p are 
distinct because the former is in your head, whereas the latter is in my head. 
Now, if philosophical evidence must be public (or transparent) in order to rationally 
persuade other professional analytic philosophers, but intuitions are not public (or transparent) 
evidence, then it follows that intuitions are not the sort of thing that has the power to rationally 
persuade other professional analytic philosophers. In other words, appeals to intuition are not 
compelling arguments because intuitions are not the sort of evidence for and/or against 
philosophical theses that has the power to rationally persuade other professional analytic 
philosophers. That is: 
(5) Philosophical evidence for and/or against philosophical theses must be public (or 
transparent) in order to have the power to rationally persuade other professional analytic 
philosophers. 
 
14 See, e.g., Booth and Rowbottom (2014). 
15 Some might think that intuitions are not mental states but rather applications of concepts. For example, when one 
intuits that S doesn’t know that p in a Gettier case, one applies one’s concept of knowledge to a Gettier case. As 
Cummins (1998, p. 125) argues, however, this would render intuitions “epistemologically useless” as a method of 
philosophical inquiry. For intuitions are supposed to provide evidence for or against philosophical theories about 
concepts, such as knowledge. But if one already has a concept of knowledge that one can apply to cases 
successfully, then one has no need for a philosophical analysis of knowledge. As Cummins (1998, p. 124) writes, “If 




 (6) Intuitions are not public (or transparent) evidence. 
 Therefore, 
(7) Intuitions lack the power to rationally persuade other professional analytic 
philosophers. 
This argument is the third part of my overall argument. Again, let me try to alleviate any 
concerns about the notion of publicity (or transparency). For a similar argument can be made by 
appealing to what Williamson (2007, p. 210) calls “Evidence Neutrality,” which is the principle 
that, “whether a proposition constitutes evidence is in principle uncontentiously decidable, in the 
sense that a community of inquirers can always in principle achieve common knowledge as to 
whether any given proposition constitutes evidence for the inquiry.”16 Insofar as the academic 
community of professional analytic philosophers is concerned, namely, Analytic Philosophy, 
common knowledge as to whether any given intuitive judgment constitutes evidence for and/or 
against a philosophical thesis is rarely, if ever, achieved.17 Now, if evidence should serve as a 
neutral arbiter for a community of inquirers, but intuitions cannot serve as neutral arbiters for 
Analytic Philosophy, then it follows that intuitions are not compelling evidence in Analytic 
Philosophy. In other words, intuition is not a source of evidence that can serve as a neutral 
arbiter in Analytic Philosophy. 
 
5. More objections and replies 
In the previous section, I argued that appeals to intuition are not compelling arguments in 
Analytic Philosophy because intuitions are not the sort of thing that has the power to rationally 
persuade other professional analytic philosophers. In this section, I anticipate and reply to 
additional objections to my overall argument. 
5.1 Professional analytic philosophers don’t appeal to intuitions in philosophical practice! 
The first objection states that intuitions are not used as evidence in Analytic Philosophy, so there 
is no need to show, as I have tried in this paper, that appeals to intuition in Analytic Philosophy 
are not compelling arguments. Following the work of Cappelen (2012), other philosophers have 
also argued that professional analytic philosophers do not use intuitions as evidence in 
philosophical practice. Nado (2016b, p. 782) calls these philosophers, such as Cappelen (2012) 
and Deutsch (2015),18 “the intuition deniers,” since they argue that “philosophers generally don’t 
employ intuitions as evidence in the first place.”19 
 
16 On evidence as neutral arbiter, see Kelly (2016). 
17 See Prinz, (2006, p. 39): “we can move beyond the typical intuition mongering in philosophy and use empirical 
findings to help adjudicate an otherwise interminable philosophical debate.” 
18 Deutsch argues that professional analytic philosophers evaluate hypothetical cases by using arguments rather than 
intuitions. Pace Deutsch, Wysocki (2017) presents the results of an experimental study according to which exposure 
to arguments about Gettier cases does not significantly influence participants’ responses. Even if Deutsch is right 
that professional analytic philosophers evaluate hypothetical cases by using arguments, it doesn’t necessarily follow 
that philosophers do not use intuitions as evidence. For, insofar as appeals to intuition are a type of argument, it can 
be true both that philosophers evaluate hypothetical cases by using arguments and that they appeal to intuition. 
19 Climenhaga (2018) argues that intuitions are used as evidence in Analytic Philosophy. 
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As Nado’s (2016b) discussion of the arguments put forth by “the intuition deniers” makes 
clear, the strategy of those intuition deniers is to define ‘intuition’ in such a way that it turns out 
that professional analytic philosophers do not use such things as evidence. As Nado (2016b, p. 
798) points out, however, the result of this strategy is “a misleading and oversimplistic 
characterization of philosophical practice.”20 For it does not matter how we define the term 
‘intuition’ (Devitt 2015).21 What matters is that, in practice, professional analytic philosophers 
appeal to what seems true to them, and the question is whether such appeals to intuition are 
compelling arguments in philosophical practice. Arvan (2017, pp. 96-97) makes this point in a 
review of a collection of essays on experimental philosophy and philosophical methodology 
edited by Nado (2016c): 
The ultimately relevant philosophical question is not whether philosophers invoke 
‘intuitions’ but whether the kinds of premises philosophers appeal to—whatever we call 
them—are epistemically suitable foundations for philosophical argumentation. 
If my overall argument is sound, then intuitions are not epistemically suitable starting points for 
philosophical argumentation, since they are not the sort of thing that can help us achieve the goal 
of Analytic Philosophy, which is to rationally persuade other professional analytic philosophers 
by means of arguments. 
To illustrate, consider the following example, which is discussed in Ashton and Mizrahi 
(2018, p. 604) as well: 
The nerve of Mr. Bennett’s argument is that if A results from your not doing B, then A 
results from whatever you do instead of doing B. While there may be much to be said for 
this view, still it does not seem right on the face of it (Anscombe 1966; emphasis added). 
In this case, Anscombe tells us that Bennett’s view seems false to her without providing any 
reasons or evidence for the claim that Bennett’s view is false other than the fact that it seems 
false to her. If anything counts as an appeal to intuition in philosophical practice, this surely 
does. That Anscombe has the intuition that Bennett’s view is false, however, does nothing at all 
to rationally persuade me (or any other professional analytic philosopher, for that matter) that 
Bennett’s view is false. In other words, an argument that appeals to Anscombe’s intuition that 
Bennett’s view is false in support of the conclusion that Bennett’s view is false is not a 
compelling argument. That is: 
P: It seems to me (namely, Anscombe) that Bennett’s view is false. 
Therefore, 
C: Bennett’s view is false. 
The premise of this argument (P) gives me no reason whatsoever to believe that the conclusion 
(C) is true or probably true. So, this argument, which is an appeal to intuition, is not a compelling 
argument. 
 
20 See Devitt (2015). 
21 See Chalmers (2014), for whom, “there is a minimal construal of intuitions as judgments with broadly 
noninferential support such that (i) this construal reflects the way the notion is used in philosophical practice, (ii) it 
is plausible that philosophy relies significantly on intuitions in this sense, and (iii) this reliance raises significant 
epistemological and methodological worries.” Cf. Cappelen (2014). 
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5.2 Some intuitions do have the power to rationally persuade other philosophers! 
The second objection states that some intuitions do have the power to rationally persuade other 
professional analytic philosophers. For example, some might think that the so-called “Gettier 
intuition” manages to do just that. The “Gettier intuition” is the intuitive judgment that a subject 
in a Gettier case doesn’t know that p. The fact that Gettier’s (1963) paper has generated an 
enormous literature in the field of epistemology (Shope 1983) is evidence that the “Gettier 
intuition” does have the power to rationally persuade other philosophers, especially 
epistemologists, or so it might be argued. 
Doing justice to the “Gettier intuition” is clearly beyond the scope of this paper. As 
mentioned above, the literature on the so-called “Gettier problem” is enormous (see, e.g., Borges 
et al., 2017). For present purposes, I hope it is enough to make the following points in reply. 
First, this objection is borderline question-begging. I provided an argument whose conclusion is 
that appeals to intuition in Analytic Philosophy are not compelling arguments, but this objection 
amounts to retorting, “Yes, they are.” (Recall Monty Python’s argument clinic mentioned in 
Section 2.) For an appeal to intuition is always an appeal to someone’s intuition, which means 
that, if one has the intuition that a subject in a Gettier case doesn’t know that p, one is appealing 
to one’s personal and private (or nontransparent) evidence. 
In other words, we must distinguish between an intuition as a personal, private, first-
person mental state and the content of that mental state. For example, the content of the “Gettier 
intuition” is <S doesn’t know that p in a Gettier case>. The reason we are supposed to believe 
this content is that the content is supposed to be intuitive. That is, Gettier cases are supposed to 
derive their power of rational persuasion from the fact that the content of the “Gettier intuition,” 
namely, <S doesn’t know that p in a Gettier case>, is supposed to be intuitive. An intuition with 
content p has the power to rationally persuade one only if one finds p intuitive, i.e., only if it 
seems to one that p. But, again, this makes intuitions inherently personal and private (or 
nontransparent), not public (or transparent), and thus not the sort of thing that can have the power 
to rationally persuade professional analytic philosophers other than oneself. The fact that you 
have the intuition that S doesn’t know that p in a Gettier case does nothing at all to rationally 
persuade me that S doesn’t know that p in a Gettier case unless I also find that content, namely, 
<S doesn’t know that p in a Gettier case>, intuitive. In an academic community of scholars, as 
Analytic Philosophy is supposed to be, the so-called “Gettier intuition” cannot serve as a neutral 
arbiter of epistemological debates concerning the nature knowledge. 
Even if the intuitions of different professional analytic philosophers have the same 
content, it is still the case that they would be appealing to different pieces of evidence to support 
that content. I might have an intuition whose content is <S doesn’t know that p in a Gettier case> 
and you might have an intuition whose content is <S doesn’t know that p in a Gettier case> as 
well. But your intuition is yours and my intuition is mine; they are distinct personal, private, 
first-person mental states, even if the content, namely, <S doesn’t know that p in a Gettier case>, 
is the same. When I appeal to intuition, I use my intuition that S doesn’t know that p in a Gettier 
case as evidence for the claim that S doesn’t know that p in a Gettier case. When you appeal to 
intuition, you use your intuition that S doesn’t know that p in a Gettier case as evidence for S 
doesn’t know that p in a Gettier case. Although we are both arguing that S doesn’t know that p in 
a Gettier case by appeal to intuition, our evidence is not the same: my evidence is my intuition 
that S doesn’t know that p in a Gettier case, whereas your evidence is your intuition that S 
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doesn’t know that p in a Gettier case. Clearly, your intuition that S doesn’t know that p in a 
Gettier case and my intuition that S doesn’t know that p in a Gettier case are distinct because the 
former is in your head, whereas the latter is in my head. This means that we are making different 
arguments effectively. Your argument is “It seems to me that S doesn’t know that p in a Gettier 
case; therefore, S doesn’t know that p in a Gettier case,” whereas my argument is “It seems to me 
that S doesn’t know that p in a Gettier case; therefore, S doesn’t know that p in a Gettier case.” I 
cannot be rationally persuaded by your argument because you are the only one who has access to 
the evidence appealed to in the premise of your argument (it is your intuition). Similarly, you 
cannot be rationally persuaded by my argument because I am the only one who has access to the 
evidence appealed to in the premise of my argument (it is my intuition). Insofar as we are both 
members of an academic community of professional analytic philosophers, whose goal is 
rational persuasion of its members by means of reasons or evidence, as long as we appeal to 
intuition, we would fail to attain our communal goal. 
Indeed, if professional analytic philosophers use intuitions as if appeals to intuition were 
compelling arguments for and/or against philosophical theses, although intuitions have no power 
of rational persuasion over other professional analytic philosophers, then this would explain why 
philosophical questions appear to be enduring, philosophical debates appear to be intractable, 
and agreement on philosophical issues appears to be practically impossible. As van Inwagen 
(2004, p. 332) writes: 
Disagreement in philosophy is pervasive and irresoluble. There is almost no thesis in 
philosophy about which philosophers agree. If there is any philosophical thesis that all or 
most philosophers affirm, it is a negative thesis: that formalism is not the right 
philosophy of mathematics, for example, or that knowledge is not (simply) justified, true 
belief. 
According to Chalmers (2015, p. 25), the appearance of pervasive and irresoluble disagreement 
in Analytic Philosophy has to do with the method used by professional analytic philosophers. 
That is, there is more disagreement and “less convergence in philosophy [than in science] 
because the philosophical method has less power to compel agreement” (Chalmers 2015, p. 25). 
Now, if my overall argument is sound, then Chalmers’ explanation for the lack of “collective 
convergence to the truth” (Chalmers 2015, p. 4) in Analytic Philosophy is spot on. To this 
explanation, we can add that this lack of “power to compel agreement” has to do with the fact 
that professional analytic philosophers appeal to intuition and that intuitions have no “power to 
compel agreement.” In other words, if a central method of philosophical argumentation is 
appealing to intuitions, but appeals to intuition are not compelling arguments because intuitions 
have no power of rational persuasion over other professional analytic philosophers, then it is not 
surprising that “there is less convergence in philosophy than in science” (Chalmers 2015, p. 27). 
For this reason, as long as professional analytic philosophers keep appealing to intuitions as if 
they were the sort of evidence for and/or against philosophical theses that has power to compel 
agreement, there would be less collective convergence to the truth in Analytic Philosophy than in 
science. As Railton (1985, p. 764) writes, “objective inquiry uses procedures that are 
intersubjective and independent of particular individuals or circumstances—for example, […] it 
makes no essential use of introspective or subjectively privileged evidence in theory 
assessment.” Insofar as intuitions are “subjectively privileged evidence,” and professional 
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analytic philosophers appeal to intuitions in philosophical practice, Analytic Philosophy cannot 
be the objective field of inquiry it must be.22 
5.3 Like perception, intuition is a source of evidence, too! 
The third objection states that my overall argument, if sound, entails not only that appeals to 
intuition are not compelling arguments but also that appeals to sense perception are not 
compelling arguments. In other words, if sense perception is a source of compelling evidence, 
then intuition is a source of compelling evidence, too, for the two are analogous in epistemically 
relevant respects. 
First, it is important to remember that the conclusion of my overall argument is (7), 
namely, that intuitions are not the sort of evidence for and/or against philosophical theses that 
has the power to rationally persuade other professional analytic philosophers. In other words, 
appeals to intuition are not the sort of arguments that can help professional analytic philosophers 
attain the goal of Analytic Philosophy, which is rational persuasion by means of arguments. This 
leaves open the possibility that intuitions could serve as compelling evidence outside of Analytic 
Philosophy. In a non-academic, non-scholarly setting, if you tell me that you see that p, I might 
take that as sufficient evidence for believing that p. Similarly, if you tell me that you intuit that p 
in a non-academic, non-scholarly setting, I might also take that as sufficient evidence for 
believing that p. When it comes to academic disciplines and scholarly fields of inquiry, however, 
that you see or intuit that p should not be construed as sufficient evidence for other researchers 
and scholars in the field for accepting p. Surely, in academic disciplines and professional fields 
of inquiry, standards of evidence should be more rigorous than that. Again, “objective inquiry 
uses procedures that are intersubjective and independent of particular individuals or 
circumstances” (Railton 1985, p. 764). 
Second, if the objection is that intuitions are private mental states and perceptions are 
private mental states, and thus perceptions are not compelling evidence because intuitions are not 
compelling evidence, then this objection relies on an invalid argument. From the fact that two 
things, X and Y, share a property in common, it doesn’t necessarily follow that X and Y also share 
other properties in common. For example, from the fact that electrons and protons are both 
subatomic particles, it doesn’t necessarily follow that both are affected by the strong force. For 
this reason, this objection, according to which my overall argument, if sound, entails not only 
that appeals to intuition are not compelling arguments but also that appeals to sense perception 
are not compelling arguments, presupposes that intuition and sense perception are analogous in 
epistemically relevant respects. For only if there is an epistemically relevant analogy between 
intuition and perception does it follow that perception is not a source of compelling evidence 
from the fact that intuition is not a source of compelling evidence. The question, then, is whether 
the supposed analogy between intuition and perception is a strong or a weak analogy. If it is a 
strong analogy, then the objection is a strong objection against my overall argument. If it is a 
weak analogy, then the objection is a weak objection against my overall argument. 
 
22 Recall the point about “Evidence Neutrality” from Section 4. Insofar as the academic community of professional 
analytic philosophers is concerned, common knowledge as to whether any given intuitive judgment constitutes 
evidence for and/or against a philosophical thesis is rarely, if ever, achieved. If my argument is sound, this fact about 
Analytic Philosophy can be explained: professional analytic philosophers use intuitions as evidence, but intuitions 
are not the sort of thing that has the power to rationally compel agreement among other professional analytic 
philosophers because intuitions are not public (or transparent) evidence. 
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Now, some philosophers think that intellectual intuition is analogous to sense perception 
in epistemically relevant respects. For example, according to Chudnoff (2013a, p. 364): 
The structural parallels between [Intuitive Knowledge] and [Perceptual Knowledge] 
should be obvious. The differences are that intuitive appearance replaces perceptual 
appearance and intellectual awareness replaces sensory awareness (emphasis added). 
Notice that the perception-intuition analogy is not argued for, but rather is taken as obvious. If 
we have learned anything from experimental philosophy, however, it is that what may seem 
obvious to some philosophers may not seem obvious to other philosophers or to non-
philosophers.23 The question, then, is whether there are good reasons to accept the alleged 
analogy between sense perception and intellectual intuition. If sense perception and intellectual 
intuition are not analogous in epistemically relevant respects, then it does not follow that appeals 
to sense perception are not compelling arguments from the claim that appeals to intuition are not 
compelling arguments. To the best of my knowledge, there are no arguments for the perception-
intuition analogy in the extant literature on metaphilosophy and philosophical methodology. As 
we have seen, it is taken for granted that sense perception and intellectual intuition are analogous 
in epistemically relevant respects, and then it is argued that, like sense perception, intellectual 
intuition is a source of evidence. For instance, like Chudnoff (2013a), Hales (2012, p. 180) 
claims that “if we regard sense perception as a mental faculty that (in general) delivers justified 
beliefs, then we should treat intuition in the same manner.” But why should we? Why think that 
sense perception and intellectual intuition should be treated in the same manner? In the absence 
of good reasons to think that they are analogous in epistemically relevant respects, it does not 
follow that appeals to sense perception are not compelling arguments from the claim that appeals 
to intuition are not compelling arguments. In other words, my overall argument would have the 
consequence that appeals to sense perception are not compelling arguments, which might seem 
absurd to some, only if sense perception and intellectual intuition are analogous in epistemically 
relevant ways. There are no good reasons to think that they are analogous in epistemically 
relevant ways. Therefore, it is not the case that my overall argument entails that appeals to sense 
perception are not compelling arguments.24 
In fact, there are good reasons to think that sense perception and intellectual intuition are 
not analogous in epistemically relevant respects. That is, there are epistemically relevant 
dissimilarities between intuition and perception, which means that the analogy between the two 
is neither obvious nor strong. While both sense perceptions and intellectual intuitions are mental 
states, the latter are private in two respects that the former are not. The first respect in which 
intuition is private, but perception is not, has to do with the supposed “faculty of intuition.” That 
is, we have a decent understanding of sensory perception, especially, visual perception (see, e.g., 
Snowden et al. 2012), whereas the so-called “faculty of intuition” (Hales 2012) is a totally 
 
23 See Sytsma and Livengood (2016, pp. 51-59) on the “negative program” in experimental philosophy. To argue 
that perception and intuition are analogous because it seems (to one) that they are is not going to convince anyone 
who doubts the perception-intuition analogy itself, for this argument presupposes what it purports to show, namely, 
that, just like perception, intuition is also a source of evidence. See, e.g., Huemer (2001, p. 112): “S might have a 
perceptual experience or an intuition representing that P. […] Is S now justified in believing that P? It seems to me 
that he is” (emphasis added). 
24 See also Pust’s (2019) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on “intuition,” where he writes that an “analogy 




mysterious thing. As Symons (2008, p. 67) writes, “While intuition is widely regarded as a 
source of belief, the manner in which intuition plays this role is obscure.” This is an 
epistemically relevant dissimilarity between sense perception and intellectual intuition because, 
in order to know whether a method of inquiry is reliable, we must have a good idea of how it is 
supposed to work. As a method of philosophical inquiry, however, appeals to intuition cannot be 
said to be reliable without having some idea of how the mysterious “faculty of intuition” is 
supposed to work. Of course, it would be question-begging to retort that the “faculty of intuition” 
is supposed to work in the same way that the visual cortex does, since the question at hand is 
whether the two are analogues in epistemically relevant respects. 
The second respect in which intuition is private, but perception is not, has to do with the 
supposed content of intuitions. As I have argued in Section 5, the content of intuitions is 
inherently personal and private (or nontransparent), not public (or transparent). I might have an 
intuition whose content is <S doesn’t know that p in a Gettier case> and you might have an 
intuition whose content is <S doesn’t know that p in a Gettier case> as well. But your intuition is 
yours and my intuition is mine; they are distinct personal, private, first-person mental states, 
even if the content, namely, <S doesn’t know that p in a Gettier case>, is the same. When I 
appeal to intuition, I use my intuition that S doesn’t know that p in a Gettier case as evidence for 
the claim that S doesn’t know that p in a Gettier case. When you appeal to intuition, you use your 
intuition that S doesn’t know that p in a Gettier case as evidence for S doesn’t know that p in a 
Gettier case. Although we are both arguing that S doesn’t know that p in a Gettier case by appeal 
to intuition, our evidence is not the same: my evidence is my intuition that S doesn’t know that p 
in a Gettier case, whereas your evidence is your intuition that S doesn’t know that p in a Gettier 
case. Clearly, your intuition that S doesn’t know that p in a Gettier case and my intuition that S 
doesn’t know that p in a Gettier case are distinct because the former is in your head, whereas the 
latter is in my head. Admittedly, there is a longstanding debate in philosophy as to whether sense 
perception (particularly, visual perception) gives us direct access to objects in the external world. 
But some philosophers do think that we perceive (or see) objects in the external world directly. If 
those philosophers are right about that, then the objects of sense perception are public (or 
transparent) in a way that the objects of intellectual intuition are not. For, unlike the objects of 
sense perception, the objects of intellectual intuition are supposed to be abstract objects, which 
can only be accessed by intuition (Chudnoff 2013a, p. 360). 
To sum up, then, intellectual intuition is private (or nontransparent) in two respects. First, 
the supposed “faculty of intuition” is private (or nontransparent) in the sense that it is totally 
mysterious to us, whereas our faculty of visual perception is not. We have no idea how the so-
called “faculty of intuition” is supposed to work. Second, the contents of intuition are private (or 
nontransparent) in the sense that the objects of intellectual intuitions are supposed to be abstract 
and accessible only to the person who is intuiting them, whereas the objects of sense perception 
are concrete and in principle accessible to all visual perceivers. 
Another epistemically relevant dissimilarity between sense perception, particularly visual 
perception, and intellectual intuition is the following: like knowing that p, the perceptual state 
seeing that p is factive (French 2013).25 That is, if S sees that p, then p is the case. If p is not the 
case, then S did not really see that p; it merely seemed to S as if she is seeing that p (as in the 
 
25 See Pritchard (2012), Part One. 
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case of hallucinations). Intuition, however, is not factive. That is, even if S intuits that p or it 
seems to S that p, p could still be false. Now, compare the following argument schemes: 
 
Appeal to Intellectual Intuition Appeal to Visual Perception 
S intuits that p. 
∴ p. 
S sees that p. 
∴ p. 
 
As far as appeals to visual perception are concerned, the truth of the premise guarantees the truth 
of the conclusion, given that seeing that p is factive. As far as appeals to intellectual intuition are 
concerned, however, the truth of the premise does not guarantee the truth of the conclusion, 
given that intuiting that p is not factive. 
To this, it might be objected that seeing that p may be factive, but visually perceiving that 
p is not. However, those who defend the evidential role of intuition in Analytic Philosophy 
would agree that visually perceiving that p is veridical. For example, according to Chudnoff 
(2013a, p. 361), “Perception is a success state: perceiving is veridical and non-hallucinatory.” 
Therefore, both seeing that p and visually perceiving that p provide compelling evidence for p 
insofar as the former is factive and the latter is veridical. Unlike perception, however, intuition is 
not a success state, for intuiting that p is neither factive nor veridical. Therefore, intuiting that p 
does not provide compelling evidence for p. 
For these reasons, appeals to intuition are inherently problematic as a philosophical 
methodology or style of argument in Analytic Philosophy. To establish the trustworthiness or 
reliability of a method of inquiry, one must be able to test the outputs of the method in 
independent ways. For example, to establish the reliability of the telescope as a trustworthy 
instrument of celestial observation, Galileo tested it by observing terrestrial objects first, such as 
ships coming into a harbor, and then comparing what he observed through the telescope to what 
he can observe independently of the instrument (Kitcher 2001). As far as appeals to intuition are 
concerned, there is no way to test the outputs of this method independently of intuition, since 
those outputs are supposed to be accessible only by intuition. This means that there is no 
independent way to establish the reliability of appeals to intuition as a trustworthy or reliable 
method of philosophical inquiry. For, if the objects of intuition are abstract objects, which can 
only be accessed by intuition, as Chudnoff (2013a, p. 360) argues, then there is no way to access 
the alleged objects of intuition other than by intuition itself. Since gaining “access to the target 
that is independent of the instrument or procedure to be calibrated” is an “invariable 
requirement” for establishing the trustworthiness or reliability of an instrument or procedure 
(Cummins 1998, p. 117), it follows that the trustworthiness or reliability of intuition as a method 
of philosophical inquiry cannot be established. In other words, “philosophical intuition could be 
calibrated, but only on the assumption that there is some nonintuitive access to its target” 
(Cummins 1998, p. 117). In the case of visual perception, I can gain access to the objects of 
visual perception that is independent of my sense of vision by using optical instruments, such as 
autocollimators, cameras, spectrometers, telescopes, etc. In the case of intuition, however, there 
is no way to gain access to the objects of intuition by any means other than intuition itself. There 
is no non-intuitive access to the targets of philosophical intuition because those targets are 




Since there are significant, epistemically relevant dissimilarities between sense 
perception and intellectual intuition, as we have seen, the alleged analogy between the two is 
weak. If it is not the case that sense perception and intellectual intuition are analogous in 
epistemically relevant respects, then it is not the case that my overall argument entails the 
allegedly absurd consequence that appeals to sense perception are not compelling arguments. 26 
5.4 If not intuitions, then what? 
Some might object that intuitions are indispensable to philosophical argumentation. That is, if 
professional analytic philosophers cannot appeal to intuitions as evidence for and/or against 
philosophical theses, what else is there? Ichikawa (2013, p. 116) discusses—though does not 
endorse—an argument along these lines, which he calls the “What Else?” argument. 
To see the problem with the “What Else?” argument, suppose that professional analytic 
philosophers could only argue by appeal to pity. By stipulation, no other method or style of 
argument is available to professional analytic philosophers. Every argument in Analytic 
Philosophy would run along the following lines: 
If you don’t agree with me that p, my reputation will be ruined. I will probably lose my 
job and my family will starve. Therefore, you must agree that p (adapted from Hurley 
2016, p. 68). 
Even if appeal to pity were the only method or style of argument available to professional 
analytic philosophers, it would still be a bad method or style of argument. The fact that it is the 
only method or style of argument that professional analytic philosophers have does not change 
the fact that it is a bad way to argue. Similarly, even if intuitions were the only thing professional 
analytic philosophers could appeal to in their arguments, it would not make a difference to 
whether or not appealing to intuition is a good way to argue. In other words, it could still be the 
case that intuitions are not the sort of thing that can rationally persuade other professional 
analytic philosophers, even if it were the case that professional analytic philosophers can only 
argue by appeals to intuition. 
Furthermore, it is not in fact true that intuitions are the only thing professional analytic 
philosophers can appeal to in their arguments. According to Dutilh Novaes (2012, p. 255), “not 
only is there room for distinct methodological approaches in philosophy but also that they should 
be combined in one and the same investigation” (emphasis in original). In addition to what she 
calls “traditional methods,” i.e., conceptual (a priori) reflection and analysis, Dutilh Novaes 
(2012, pp. 250-254) identifies the following methods that are available to professional analytic 
philosophers: 
1. Formal methods: the application of mathematical and logical formalisms to philosophical 
questions (e.g., formal epistemology and formal semantics); 
2. Historical methods: the use of the history of philosophy to understand philosophically 
relevant concepts (e.g., historical epistemology and HPS); 
3. Empirical methods: informing philosophical discussions with empirical results from the 
sciences (e.g., moral psychology and experimental philosophy). 
 
 
26 Mizrahi (2014, p. 193) argues that “making intuitive judgments in response to intuition pumps is as unreliable as 
making perceptual judgments in response to illusions.” 
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Unlike intuitions, logical formalisms, historical documents, and empirical results are public (or 
transparent). As such, they have the power to rationally persuade other professional analytic 
philosophers. In other words, appeals to intuition are not compelling arguments because 
intuitions are not the sort of evidence for and/or against philosophical theses that has the power 
to rationally persuade other professional analytic philosophers, whereas appeals to logical 
formalisms, historical documents, and empirical results can be compelling arguments because 
logical formalisms, historical documents, and empirical results are the sort of evidence that has 
the power to rationally persuade other professional analytic philosophers. When I argue that p by 
appeal to intuition, my evidence is my own intuition that p, whereas when you argue that p by 
appeal to intuition, your evidence is your own intuition that p. By contrast, when we argue that p 




In this paper, I argued that appeals to intuition in Analytic Philosophy are not compelling 
arguments for and/or against philosophical theses because intuitions are not the sort of thing that 
has the power to rationally persuade other professional analytic philosophers. This conclusion 
follows from reasonable premises about the goal of Analytic Philosophy, which is rational 
persuasion by means of arguments, and the requirement that evidence for and/or against 
philosophical theses be public (or transparent) in order to have the power to rationally persuade 
professional analytic philosophers other than oneself. Since intuitions are not public (or 
transparent) evidence, it follows that appeals to intuition are not compelling arguments for and/or 
against philosophical theses because they lack the power to rationally persuade other 
professional analytic philosophers. If this is correct, then appeals to intuition to professional 
analytic philosophers are like Jedi mind tricks to Jabba the Hutt: they do not work. 
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